Connection check
verified live · 28h ago
agents-4
Pay-per-call safety guards for AI agents: injection, tool-call, signing, secret, x402-trust.
Tools
7
GitHub stars
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Installs / wk
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Licence
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Transport
streamable-http
Last checked
28h ago
Tools & capabilities
7 toolsRead from the running server on 28h ago.
inject-guard
content*context
Untrusted-content guardrail for agents: submit a blob of text you are about to feed to your own LLM (scraped web content, a tool result, another agent's message) and get a machine-… Untrusted-content guardrail for agents: submit a blob of text you are about to feed to your own LLM (scraped web content, a tool result, another agent's message) and get a machine-enforceable verdict - is this a prompt-injection / jailbreak / data-exfiltration / tool-hijack attempt? Returns a risk level, the detected classes with spans, the unicode obfuscation it found (zero-width, bidi-override, tag-chars, homoglyphs), and a SANITIZED copy safe to feed onward. Hybrid: a deterministic, uninjectable pattern engine (authoritative) plus an LLM classifier that can only raise the risk, never clear a flag. Detection of known injection classes - not a proof of safety. [security; up to 15c/call]
pr-summary
diff*style
Turn a git diff into a clear PR description or release notes. [dev-tools; up to 30c/call] Turn a git diff into a clear PR description or release notes. [dev-tools; up to 30c/call]
secret-scan
content*
Leaked-credential guardrail for agents: submit a blob you are about to commit, log, post, or hand to another tool (a diff, a config, an .env, an LLM output) and get a machine-enfor… Leaked-credential guardrail for agents: submit a blob you are about to commit, log, post, or hand to another tool (a diff, a config, an .env, an LLM output) and get a machine-enforceable verdict - does it contain a live secret? Detects cloud keys (AWS), VCS tokens (GitHub/GitLab), provider API keys (Stripe, OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Slack), private-key blocks, JWTs, and credentials embedded in URLs, plus high-entropy key=value assignments. Returns a risk level, the detected classes with a MASKED locator (never the secret itself, so the verdict cannot re-leak), and a REDACTED copy safe to emit onward. Deterministic, sub-second, never fetches. Detection of known secret formats - not a proof of cleanliness. [security; up to 200c/call]
secure-code-review
code*contextlanguage
Security review of a code snippet or diff. Returns structured findings (severity, CWE, location, remediation). [security; up to 75c/call] Security review of a code snippet or diff. Returns structured findings (severity, CWE, location, remediation). [security; up to 75c/call]
sign-guard
txcontextexpectedtypedDataspendPolicy
Pre-sign safety oracle for agent wallets: submit the transaction or EIP-712 message you are about to sign and get a machine-enforceable verdict. Decodes the calldata/typed-data, fl… Pre-sign safety oracle for agent wallets: submit the transaction or EIP-712 message you are about to sign and get a machine-enforceable verdict. Decodes the calldata/typed-data, flags the drainer toolkit (unlimited approvals, setApprovalForAll, permit/permit2 + EIP-3009 to an unexpected party, transferFrom draining an unnamed account, ownership transfer, raw ETH to a stranger), and binds the decoded action to your stated intent - only a fully pinned, clean action is auto-sign-safe. Fails closed: an undecodable on-chain call is cautioned and an unrecognized off-chain signature grant is blocked. Deterministic, sub-second, no endpoint fetch. It vouches that the action matches what you said; it does NOT vouch that a counterparty is trustworthy. [security; up to 200c/call]
tool-call-guard
call*intentcontextexpected
Pre-execution safety oracle for agent actions: submit the tool call you are about to run (shell, http, sql, file, code, env) plus your stated intent, and get a machine-enforceable… Pre-execution safety oracle for agent actions: submit the tool call you are about to run (shell, http, sql, file, code, env) plus your stated intent, and get a machine-enforceable verdict before you execute it. Decodes what the call does, flags the danger toolkit (rm -rf, reverse shell, curl|sh, SSRF to cloud metadata, credential reads, DROP/DELETE-without-WHERE, path traversal, dynamic eval), and binds it to your intent (allowedHosts/allowedPaths/readOnly/noNetwork) - only a fully pinned, clean, intent-matched call is auto-exec-safe. Hybrid: a deterministic, uninjectable detector engine (authoritative) plus an LLM classifier that can only raise the risk. Fails closed. Detection of known-dangerous patterns, not a proof of safety; it never executes the call. [security; up to 8c/call]
x402-trust-audit
contextexpectedendpointUrlspendPolicypaymentPayloadserverMetadata
+2